

TOP SECRET

25X1

10 April 1964

25X1

Copy No. C *EW-8*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

State Dept., JCS reviews completed.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007600200001-5

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007600200001-5

10 April 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Brazil: Military leaders have issued strong anti-Communist decree. (Page 1)
2. Cyprus: Turkey determined to keep troops on Nicosia-Kyrenia road and may go to UN. (Page 3)
3. South Vietnam: Viet Cong maintaining heavy pressure on Saigon regime. (Page 5)
4. Chile: Christian Democrat presidential candidate Frei optimistic over his prospects. (Page 6)




25X1

6. Gabon: New violence likely following elections on 12 April. (Page 8)



25X1

8. Communist China - International: Peiping attempting to ensure its domination of planned second Afro-Asian conference. (Page 10)

9. Notes: British Guiana;  (Page 11)

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

10 April 1964

DAILY BRIEF

*Brazil: Military leaders of the revolt which overthrew the Goulart regime last week have issued a strong decree aimed at removing Communists and other subversives from the government and armed forces.


War Minister Costa e Silva yesterday announced the signing of an "institutional act" which suspends certain constitutional guarantees. It also grants authority to remove the immunity of congressmen and to set aside the tenure of judges and professors, thereby opening the way for possible prosecutions under national security laws.

Congressional leaders had been consulted regarding the new decree, but the military appear to have assumed complete authority in the matter. Although a majority of the legislators seems to be in favor of revoking the mandates of ten or twelve deputies who are clearly implicated in subversive activities, they fear that such sweeping powers may be used indiscriminately.

The election of a president to serve out the remainder of Goulart's term and a vice-president is expected within the next day or two. General Castello Branco is still considered the likely choice for the presidency, although support has been growing for the election of General Amaury Kruel, commander of the Second Army.

(continued)

A conservative congressman close to the interim regime has expressed the opinion to the US Embassy that relations with the USSR would continue, but that the number of Soviet officials in Brazil would be sharply reduced.



25X1

10 Apr 64

DAILY BRIEF

2

Cyprus: Turkey remains determined to keep its troops stationed along the important Nicosia-Kyrenia road despite threats of military or political action by the Greek Cypriots.

Makarios has threatened to refer the problem of the Turkish regiment to the UN Security Council, and has also announced that the regiment's supplies and water will be cut off.

In Ankara, both political and military leaders have emphasized that Turkey will react automatically to any Greek Cypriot attempt to oust the Turkish contingent from the road.

25X1

25X1

The US Embassy notes that Turkey is making a clear distinction between its right to intervene on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots and its obligation to react immediately to any attack against Turkish troops.

A Turkish representative at UN headquarters has informed US officials that his government is "strongly inclined" to call for another urgent Security Council meeting on Cyprus.

He said the reasons for the Turkish action are: Makarios' abrogation of the Treaty of Alliance on 4 April, the threat to cut off water and supplies for the Turkish contingent, alleged agreement between the UN peace-keeping force commander and Makarios to disarm all Cypriots except the Greek Cypriot police, general deterioration of the situation on Cyprus, and a desire to get ahead of the Greek Cypriots who have also announced plans to go to the Security Council.

[Most high Greek officials reportedly are opposed to the return to Cyprus of former underground leader]

10 Apr 64

DAILY BRIEF

3

[George Grivas.]

25X1

[Communists, left-wing sympathizers, and some pro-Makarios newspapers on the island are alleging that the Western powers are supporting the movement. They probably see this line as a means of combating the current wave of popular support for union with Greece.]

25X1

10 Apr 64

DAILY BRIEF

4



South Vietnam: The Viet Cong are maintaining heavy pressure on the Saigon regime.

The Viet Cong raid on a military training center 15 miles south of Saigon on 8 April was the third major attack on a government post in the Mekong Delta this month. Initial reports state that the government forces suffered heavy losses of personnel and equipment. A government battalion is reported to have been ambushed in the delta yesterday.

Since early March, the Viet Cong have instigated over 400 incidents per week, compared with weekly averages of 363 and 343 in 1962 and 1963 respectively. Terrorism--largely harassing fire on hamlets and outposts--accounts for 70 percent of the incidents this year.

Viet Cong political activity is also substantial. Guerrilla forces in the northern coastal province of Quang Ngai have increasingly assumed the role of a "de facto" government. On many occasions, small Viet Cong teams have entered government hamlets, "eliminated" local officials, and issued their own directives to the people.

25X1

10 Apr 64

DAILY BRIEF

5

Chile: Christian Democrat presidential hopeful Eduardo Frei has expressed considerable optimism over his prospects in the reconstituted three-way Chilean presidential race.

His confidence, apparently influenced by his strong showing in public opinion polls taken some weeks ago, may no longer be fully justified. Although the resumed candidacy of Radical Party (PR) Senator Duran is preferable to PR endorsement of Communist-Socialist candidate Allende, its effect on democratic prospects in the September election is still somewhat uncertain.

In contrast to Frei's enthusiasm, leaders of the Radical Youth organization last week again cautioned US Embassy officers in Santiago that Duran would hold only 40 percent of the PR hard core--votes which otherwise would go to Frei--while in their view 60 percent would vote for Allende.

Furthermore, although Liberal and Conservative party leaders are swinging into the Frei camp, some of their followers may prefer Duran, thus adding to the potential division of the non-Communist, non-Socialist vote. Traditional Liberal and Conservative strength has also been eroded by Communist inroads among farm workers.

25X1

10 Apr 64

DAILY BRIEF

6

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007600200001-5

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007600200001-5

Gabon: [New violence is likely in Gabon immediately after, if not during legislative elections to be held 12 April, despite the continued presence of French troops.]

[President Mba, with French help, will rig the election results, although Mba's candidates conceivably could win legally because of divisions in the opposition. Announcement of the results will probably ignite explosive sentiments against Mba and the French which have built up in Gabon since Mba's restoration by the French Army in February.]

[The chief of the French aid mission in Gabon, who maintains that his views are those of his government, has told a US Embassy officer that Mba would be on his own after the elections. The French official said the withdrawal of French Army support would be intended to force Mba to compromise with his opponents--something Mba has thus far shown no willingness to do.]

[It is unlikely that Mba's principal opponents, most of whom are in prison, would now accept anything short of his ouster. The embassy believes antigovernment sentiment now is so strong that Mba will be forced to go "sooner rather than later."]

25X1

10 Apr 64

DAILY BRIEF

8

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007600200001-5

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007600200001-5

Communist China - International: The Chinese Communists are attempting to ensure their domination of the second Afro-Asian conference, to be held later this year, by sending a high-level delegation to its preparatory meeting.

This meeting is to be held in Bandung from 10 to 14 April. Foreign Minister Chen Yi left Peiping on 9 April to head the Chinese delegation already on the scene.

The Chinese have consistently supported the conference as a rival to the forthcoming conference of nonaligned nations pushed by Tito and Nasir. *The Indonesians had appeared reluctant to invite the Chinese to the preparatory meeting, probably because they hoped to dominate the conference themselves, but flagging Afro-Asian interest in the conference may have triggered the invitation to Peiping.

Neither the USSR nor any of the Soviet bloc states has been invited to the preparatory conference, nor are they likely to attend the full conference.

25X1

NOTES

British Guiana: [The renewal of violence and agitation in the last few days by the pro-Jagan Guiana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) in connection with the two-month-old sugar strike may indicate that GAWU is fearful of losing its battle to displace the anti-Jagan Manpower Citizens Association (MPCA) as sole bargaining agent for the sugar workers. The MPCA, which is now officially authorized to form vigilante groups, is threatening reprisals and further violence seems probable.]

25X1

25X1

10 Apr 64

DAILY BRIEF

11

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The United States Intelligence Board approved the following national intelligence estimates on 8 April 1964:

25X1

NIE 36-64: "Main Trends in the Arab World."

25X1

10 Apr 64

DAILY BRIEF

12

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007600200001-5

THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007600200001-5

Approved For Release 2003/12/25 : CIA-RDP81-00975A007600200001-5

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/12/25 : CIA-RDP81-00975A007600200001-5

TOP SECRET